Dynamic veri cation is a new approach to formal veri cation, applicable to generic algorithms such as those found in the Standard Template Library (STL, part of the Draft ANSI/ISO C++ Standard Library). Using behavioral abstraction and symbolic execution techniques, veri cations are carried out at a meta-level such that the results can be used in a variety of instances of the generic algorithms without repeating the proofs. This is achieved by substituting for type parameters of generic algorithms special data types that model generic concepts by accepting symbolic inputs and deducing outputs using inference methods. By itself, this symbolic execution technique supports testing of programs with symbolic values at a meta-level. For formal verication we also need to generate multiple program execution paths and use assertions (to handle while loops, for example), but we show how this can be achieved via directives to a conventional debugger program and an analysis database. The assertions must still be supplied, but they can be packaged separately and evaluated as needed by appropriate transfers of control orchestrated via the debugger. Unlike all previous veri cation methods, the dynamic veri cation method thus works without having to transform source code or process it with special interpreters. We include an example of the formal veri cation of an STL generic algorithm.
Introduction
We present a new approach to formal veri cation of programs, called dynamic veri cation, and its application to C++ template-based generic algorithms. Whereas all previous verication methods have had to transform the source code or process it with special interpreters, such as a veri cation condition generator, the dynamic veri cation method is able to work directly with the original source code compiled with a conventional compiler. The method depends on two key insights. First, rather than viewing type parameters of generic algorithms as a complication, we can turn them to advantage by substituting for them special data types called Run-time Analysis Oracles (RAOs) 28], which work with symbolic inputs and compute outputs using inference methods. By itself, this technique is a form of symbolic execution that supports testing with symbolic values, thereby covering large or in nite sets of inputs in each individual test. The set of data types covered by a RAO can also be in nite and can include data types that are non-isomorphic (such as one type in which an operator is commutative and another type in which the same operator is noncommutative).
Something more is needed, however, for formal veri cation|the ability to control program execution paths and use assertions (such as function pre-and post-conditions and loop invariants). This brings us to the second key insight behind dynamic veri cation, that we can achieve the necessary control via directives to a conventional debugging system. The assertions must still be supplied, but they can be packaged separately and symbolically executed as needed by appropriate transfers of control (achieved by setting breakpoints). And we can similarly use debugger commands, with the help of an analysis database, to cause the program to execute multiple execution paths as needed for case analysis and inductive proof methods.
We brie y describe the MEta-Level program Analysis System (MELAS), which supports the dynamic veri cation method for C++ template-based generic algorithms. MELAS extends a conventional debugging system with additional commands for formal veri cation, symbolic testing, and rapid-prototyping using executable speci cations. Since MELAS is an extension of debugging tools many programmers are already familiar with, and it can be applied selectively to small program segments, it should help to achieve more widespread use of symbolic execution and formal veri cation technology.
MELAS is still under development, but a preliminary version has su cient capabilities to formally verify simple generic algorithms taken directly from the ANSI/ISO C++ Standard Template Library (STL) 26, 28, 29] . We give one such example in this paper and relate some of our experience with other examples.
Many aspects of the dynamic veri cation method are based in part on previous work on symbolic execution, formal speci cation of abstract data types and generic concepts, and axiomatic treatments of imperative programming languages. In each case, we have had to adapt previous methods to make it possible to use them without transforming source code. We organize the part of the symbolic execution method that deals with types into a library of RAOs. Each RAO has two distinct levels, which we call the interface level and the inference level, a structure similar to that of Larch speci cations 6, 31]. The major di erence is that Larch speci cations do not have to be executable, but that is a requirement for dynamic veri cation.
The logical foundation for the way dynamic veri cation deals with imperative program constructs (e.g., assignment, conditional, and loop statements) is based on axioms and inference rules similar in spirit to Hoare's axiomatic approach 7] but di erent in important details. We use Hoare triples and a forward-assignment axiom to justify the way symbolic execution proceeds through program statements in the normal forward order (as opposed to the backward order necessary with the usual assignment axiom in Hoare's system). 1 We also treat while loops di erently from Hoare's approach: instead of using loop invariant assertions, we use pre/post conditions and an inference rule akin to the subgoal induction method 16]. Details of this formal foundation can be found in 18] and 28].
Generic Algorithms
Generic algorithms are called generic because they are expressed in terms of type or function parameters that can be instantiated in many di erent ways to produce di erent versions of the algorithms. As a simple example|one that we take up in more detail later|consider the STL generic copy algorithm. This algorithm copies a sequence of values in a data structure to other locations in the same or another data structure. The range of locations to be copied is indicated in STL with objects called iterators, which are a generalization of C++ pointers. We discuss the actual STL algorithm later; for the moment, let us simplify matters somewhat by considering a version that just uses pointers. The source sequence is indicated using two pointers, first and last, pointing to the rst location and one beyond the last location to be copied. The destination is indicated with a single pointer, result, pointing to the rst location into which the values are copied. Here is how such a copy operation might be coded as a template function in C++: template <class T, class U> 1 Although the use of symbolic execution in software veri cation goes back to some of the earliest program veri cation systems 11, 12, 13] , and forward assignment axioms are sometimes mentioned in the literature (e.g., see 5, p. 120]), we are not aware of any axiomatic system with this approach as its basis. U* copy(T* first, T* last, U* r) { while (f != last) *result++ = *first++; return result; } Instances of this algorithm can be created using any types T and U such that assignments (with operator =) are de ned with right hand sides of type T and left hand sides of type U. For example, Based on these calls three di erent instances of the copy algorithm are created by the C++ compiler, with type signatures double* copy(int*, int*, double*) int* copy(int*, int*, int*) double* copy(double*, double*, double*)
The rst of these instances is used in call 1, the second in calls 2 and 4, and the third in call 3. These instances are all legal because C++ de nes assignment from int to double and vice-versa, but the following call might not be legal: For this version to work, we must be able to obtain from InputIterator the same operators as we did in the rst version from T*, namely != (dis-equality predicate), ++ (incrementing) and * (dereferencing). Similarly, from OutputIterator we must be able to obtain the same operators as we did from U*, namely incrementing and dereferencing. Moreover these operators must have certain semantic properties similar to those of pointer types, in order for the algorithm to work correctly. Pointer types have the required properties (all of the example calls previously given still work with this version), but there are many other possible ways to de ne types that satisfy the iterator type requirements. For example, STL de nes list iterators that follow links in a linked-list representation when incremented, such that we can copy a list to an array, for example. Thus, this second version of copy is much more generic than the rst.
In the next section, we show how to formally capture and represent the semantic properties common to all the data types that can be used to replace type parameters (such as InputIterator and OutputIterator) of a generic algorithm.
3 Overview of Tecton Concept Speci cations Tecton 8, 9, 10 ] is a speci cation language for describing and using abstract concepts in formal software development and hardware design. One of the main goals of Tecton is to reduce the need for proof. Tecton achieves this goal by supporting behavioral abstraction and data abstraction as well. Using behavioral abstraction, a software or hardware component can be purposely only partially speci ed by omitting irrelevant properties. Thus a single Tecton speci cation can cover a broad category of components sharing the same set of properties. One proof at the abstract level of a Tecton speci cation can be used in a variety of instances without repeating the proof.
The basic unit of Tecton speci cation is the Tecton concept description. A Tecton concept description determines a concept, which is de ned as a set of many-sorted algebras. A manysorted algebra is a pair hS; Fi, where S is an indexed family of sets such that S is a mapping from a collection of sort names to the collection of sets and F is an indexed family of functions such that F is a mapping from a collection of function descriptions to a collection of functions, with a constraint that for each pair ( ; f) in F, where has domain sorts s 1 ; :::; s n and range sort r, f is a function with domain S(s 1 ) ::: S(s n ) and range S(r).
A Tecton concept is described by a series of statements, each of which can be a de nition, abbreviation, extension, realization or lemma. Each statement introduces or refers to a concept name, called the subject of the concept. A de nition is a concept description of the form:
Definition: concept-name re nes-clause; uses-clause; introduces-clause; generates-clause; obeys-clause. The re nes-clause lists previously-de ned concepts that this de nition extends with new sorts, operators, or properties. The uses-clause lists previously-de ned concepts that are used in this de nition without the intent to extend them. The introduces-clause is a list of sorts and/or functions introduced by the de nition. The generates-clause limits the set corresponding to a sort to contain only elements generated by functions listed in the clause. The obeys-clause is a list of properties that must be satis ed by all the algebras of the concept. The ve clauses are optional, but at least one of them must be present.
Some examples of Tecton concept de nitions are:
Definition: Boolean introduces bool, true -> bool, false -> bool; generates bool freely using true, false. 
Abstract Implementations
Unless it contains a generates-clause, a Tecton concept de nition does not necessarily de ne a single abstract data type or even a set of isomorphic abstract data types. For example, in concept de nition Associative-binary-op, the + operation is not fully de ned and all algebras that have the + operation de ned obeying the associative property are included in the concept. These include an algebra on integers with the usual + operation and an algebra on character strings with + de ned as concatenation of strings; these algebras are not isomorphic since the rst operation is commutative while the second is not. Thus it is impossible to implement a Tecton concept description in a programming language using conventional abstract data type de nition mechanisms such as normal C++ classes without losing its generality.
To allow a generic algorithm to be dynamically veri ed, we need to construct special data types that possess the following properties: they can be used during compilation like normal data types to replace the type parameters of generic algorithms; the compiled program can be executed in a conventional program execution environment; and the values of the type can be represented symbolically and relations between them can be computed by inference mechanisms. To provide such data types, we developed a new implementation method called abstract implementation.
An abstract implementation of a Tecton concept description consists of two layers: an interface data type written in a programming language, and the sets of rules representing Tecton concepts. We call the former a Run-time Analysis Oracle (RAO) and the latter an Inference Engine (IE).
In our current implementation, a RAO is represented as a C++ class and an IE is implemented as a Prolog program (a set of rules derived from concept descriptions), and the RAOs and IEs are loosely connected through a message-passing mechanism.
Inference Engines
An Inference Engine (IE) is a computational system that derives a result from inputs using logical reasoning and maintains the semantics of symbolic values. It is based on constructive (executable) speci cations consisting of a set of axioms and inference rules. The IEs used in this paper are derived, in a way similar to that described in 4], from a set of Tecton concept speci cations, which are not necessarily constructive.
An IE usually consists of several parts. The interface is a set of functions that receive queries and commands from clients and send results back to clients. Commands are usually translated into database access functions to access the fact database. The fact database stores and manages knowledge about symbolic values, in the form of a set of constraints such as a = b, where a and b are symbolic values. The knowledge in the fact database can be dynamically enhanced and changed by the clients through updating commands. The fact database is also accessed by inference rules to derive new facts from old. The inference rules are separated from clients by the interface, and they may be more complex than would be obtained by a straightforward translation from properties in Tecton speci cations. For example, consider the following Tecton de nition that speci es properties of an equality operator:
Definition: Equality refines Set; obeys (for x, y, z: domain) x = x, x = y implies y = x, x = y and y = z implies x = z.
Unlimited use of the last property, transitivity, can result in in nite loops. To break cycles, the corresponding Prolog rules are expressed using an auxiliary list of symbols already seen, and an auxiliary function, member, for checking membership in the list: 
Run-Time Analysis Oracles
An inference engine cannot be used directly as a data type to instantiate a C++ generic algorithm. For formal rules in IEs to be used by C++ generic algorithms, we developed a mechanism, called run-time analysis oracles (RAOs), to bind the IEs with the C++ generic algorithm being veri ed. A RAO has a C++ class interfaces, but its data are represented as symbolic values, and its functions operate on symbolic values and rely on formal rule-based IEs to do the state-independent symbolic computation.
To make the representation general and easy to manipulate, we represent the data as strings. For instance, the data of the RAO for the total order concept are implemented as in the following: The semantics of symbolic values are de ned by inference rules and the constraints on the symbolic values (or facts) stored in the fact database of the IE.
RAO functions, which are usually partial, are de ned on the basis of formal rules in IEs. A RAO translates a function call into queries to the IEs and combines the answers back into the result of the function call. For example, in the following de nition of operator < of the total order RAO, the comparison of two objects of the RAO is translated by IE answer into queries to an IE for the total order concept: bool operator<(const total_order& x, const total_order& y) { return IE_answer(x, y, LS, MLS, MNL, " < "); } IE answer also translates the result from the IE back into the bool return value of operator <.
Since the data of RAOs are symbolic values and their semantics are interpreted by facts and inference rules (see Section 4.1), the meaning of the data can be easily changed by altering the set of facts in the IEs. Symbolic values with weaker constraints cover a larger state space of the programs. Thus, by posing weak initial constraints on the symbolic inputs for the algorithm under analysis, a wide range of execution paths can be covered. However, this also means that at some branching point of the execution path tree, the IEs will not nd enough facts in the fact database to answer a query. To handle this situation, a RAO must be able to determine if an IE has enough facts to answer a query, and if not, must obtain new facts to process the query. The facts so obtained must be added to the database for later use.
There are two sources from which a RAO can get additional facts. First, the RAO can dynamically ask the user to decide an answer. Second, both answers to a query can be separately generated in a case analysis approach, keeping track of all possibilities for the missing facts in an analysis database.
A Speci cation Technique for Dynamic Veri cation
In this section, we describe a speci cation technique developed for dynamic veri cation that allows speci cations to be de ned by a set of high-level formal rules, yet also to be directly evaluated in the same execution environment as that of the program being veri ed.
In our dynamic veri cation system, a program (segment) is speci ed by describing its precondition state and post-condition state. Like Larch speci cations 6, 31], speci cations for dynamic veri cation are two-tiered. The interface speci cations, which consist of assertions about program states, make up one tier. The abstract concept speci cations that de ne the semantics of symbolic values and primitive concepts, on which the assertions depend, constitute the other tier.
A major di erence between the speci cation method for dynamic veri cation and that of Larch is in their goals. Larch is mainly used for system development and static program analysis while we use speci cations to support dynamic program analysis. Thus, the speci cations in our system have to be executable, while those in Larch do not.
To make speci cations executable, our interface speci cations only use constructs from the target language, C++. The whole speci cation for a template function is packaged into a template class, called a speci cation class. It contains a list of variables, called the save list, and three functions: a pre-condition function, a post-condition function, and an updating function.
In many cases the post-condition must refer both to the state before execution of the speci ed statements and the state afterwards. The save list in the speci cation class holds those variables in the prior state to which the post-condition refers.
The pre-condition function does two things when is called: rst, it saves the current symbolic values of variables in the save list; and second, it evaluates the pre-condition of the speci cation. The post-condition function just evaluates the post-condition.
The updating function is the key technique for inductive veri cation and can be also used for fast-prototyping of speci cations. It updates the state by executing the speci cation instead of the original program segment.
Note that the speci cation class written in C++ is only one part of the entire speci cation of a template function. The primitive concepts relating to (symbolic) values, on which state assertions rely, are de ned with formal inference rules in IEs and are linked with the speci cation class through RAOs.
As an example, consider the interface speci cation of the STL generic copy algorithm discussed in introductory section. The call copy(first, last, result) copies a sequence of values from the range of locations determined by iterators first, which points to the rst element, and last, which points to one position past the last element, to the range that begins in the location to which result points. Let range(first, last) denote the sequence of iterators first, first + 1, . . . , last -1. We extend the C/C++ dereferencing operator * so that *range(first, last) means *first, *(first + 1), . . . , *(last -1 6 The MELAS System MELAS is a MEta-Level integrated Analysis System, which is being developed for the analysis of C++ template-based generic algorithms. It allows users to verify, test, and fastprototype C++ generic programs at a meta-level directly; di erent analysis methods can even be integrated and used in the same analysis session such that one part of the program is analyzed with one method and another part is analyzed with another method.
MELAS consists of a control infrastructure for coordinating analysis activities, implemented on top of the GNU C/C++ debugging system, GDB; a database for managing analysis data and controlling the coverage of analysis paths; and a communication infrastructure for linking IEs and RAOs.
Veri cation and testing of generic algorithms can be carried out fully automatically or manually. The automatic analysis of a generic algorithm is controlled by a GDB command script that determines the process of the analysis, such as when and where to check specications.
To dynamically verify a generic algorithm with MELAS, we need to embed it into a main function such that it can be compiled with a conventional compiler into an executable and run in the debugging system. In this main function the generic algorithm is called with objects of suitable RAOs. For example, to verify the STL copy algorithm, we create following main function: #include "Prolog_agency.h" #include "DBagent.h" #include "input_itr.h" // RAO for input iterator properties #include "output_itr.h" // RAO for output iterator properties #include "equality.h" // RAO for equality/dis-equality properties #include "copy_spec.h" // Specification of STL generic copy algorithm typedef input_itr<equality> itype; // itype is RAO for input iterators typedef output_itr<equality> otype; // otype is RAO for output iterators copy_spec<itype, otype, equality> A, B; // instantiate copy_spec and create A and B for use in the proof DBagent DB; // database agent, giving access to analysis database #include <stl/algobase.h> // Definition of STL generic copy algorithm int main() { itype f("f"); itype l = f.Itr_plus(sym_int("d")); otype r("r"), rptr; rptr = copy(f, l, r); } In the program, f, l, and r are RAO objects with symbolic values "f", "f + d", and "r" respectively. A and B are objects of copy spec, the speci cation class for the copy algorithm. (We discuss their usage in Section 6.2.) Object DB allows MELAS to access the analysis database.
Note that the template algorithm under analysis (copy) does not need to be processed or transformed; it is included into the main function directly from the library. The pre/postcondition functions de ned in the copy spec are not inserted into or called in the copy source code; they are compiled and linked into the same environment with the main function and called by the veri cation system via the debugger.
Veri cation
To carry out the actual veri cation of a generic algorithm with MELAS, we carry out the following process.
First we start execution of the program in MELAS with some weak constraints on the symbolic inputs (or with some initial constraints to choose a limited set of execution paths).
Next, MELAS stops the execution before the rst line of the algorithm and calls the pre-condition function to both save values for the later use in the post-condition and check if the condition is true. If it is false, the veri cation attempt terminates; if it is true, MELAS resumes the execution and stops it after the last line of the algorithm.
MELAS then calls the post-condition function to see if the post-condition is true. If so, the particular path taken through the algorithm is veri ed; otherwise it is not. If there is more than one execution path within the algorithm, MELAS will go through every path the user chooses to analyze. The algorithm is veri ed if and only if all its paths are veri ed.
To analyze multiple paths, a database system is used to organize assumptions along each path. For each assertion (query) sent to the inference engine (IE) that returns an unknown, the current path is split into two: one branch takes the assertion as a new assumption and another takes the negation of the assertion as the new assumption. At any time the user can force the program to execute to a particular point along a path by ushing the existing assumptions, loading all assumptions made along the path up to that point, and rerunning the program.
The above description is general. The details depend on the concrete language constructs used in the program segment. As an example, we consider the veri cation process for while loops. (Other constructs are generally easier to deal with.)
In MELAS a while loop is veri ed inductively. The inductive rule splits the veri cation of into a basis case and an inductive case. If both cases are veri ed, the while loop is veri ed. The details are as follows: to save the pre-state of the whole while loop and to evaluate the pre-condition; if it is false, the veri cation attempt fails; if it is true, continue the execution; if it is unknown, answer the RAOs' yes/no questions to make assumptions that make the pre-condition true.
4. During the evaluation of the while-loop condition, the RAOs may again ask the user or the case analysis controller for inputs to complete the evaluation. Di erent inputs may lead to di erent paths. 5. In the case of a false while-loop condition, exit the while loop. 6. Check A.postcond; if it is false, the while loop is not veri ed; if it is true, pass the control to the case analysis controller to check the database for another path waiting for veri cation. 
Veri cation of copy algorithm
The following is a transcript of a fully automatic veri cation of the STL generic copy algorithm given at the end of Section 2. (Recall that this algorithm is taken directly from the Hewlett-Packard implementation of STL.) There are four kinds of prompts used: MELAS MSG, Iterator RAO, >, and (gdb) . Text after MELAS MSG contains information and hints from the analysis system. Following Iterator RAO is a yes/no question asked by a RAO. After > is a direction from MELAS. After prompt (gdb) , users should input a GDB command. To start the veri cation, we call GDB with a initialization le, copy.gdbinit, which is a command script that sets up breakpoints in the copy and copy spec source code. The database is successfully loaded; GDB command cont resumes the execution of program. MELAS resumes the execution and makes assumptions about symbolic values automatically. In this case, it assumes NOT f0 != f0+d, or f0 == f0+d in which f0 is a symbolic iterator value and d is a symbolic integer value, which means that the source range of the copy algorithm is empty. Thus this is the basis case. 
Conclusion
We have presented a new approach to formal veri cation, called dynamic veri cation, and its application to C++ template-based generic algorithms. The method employs Hoare-style pre/post-condition speci cations, symbolic execution based on forward assignment axioms (rather than the usual backward substitution), and a while-loop inference rule based on subgoal induction. The symbolic execution mechanism includes multiple run-time analysis oracles, each of which consists provides a C++ interface to one or more rule-based inference engines. We brie y described the MELAS system, which supports the dynamic veri cation method. MELAS extends a conventional debugging system with additional commands for formal verication, normal and symbolic testing, and rapid-prototyping using executable speci cations.
Since MELAS is an extension of debugging tools many programmers are already familiar with, and it can be applied selectively to small program segments, it should assist in achieving more widespread use of symbolic execution and formal veri cation technology. MELAS is still under development, but a preliminary version has su cient capabilities to formally verify simple generic algorithms taken directly from the ANSI/ISO C++ Standard Template Library. One example is the generic copy algorithm discussed in this paper.
Another is the STL generic adjacent_find algorithm, for searching a sequence for the rst pair of adjacent equal elements. An interesting point about adjacent_find is that it is not correct as originally speci ed in 26]. The original speci cation said that adjacent_find could be used with input iterators, but input iterators do not have all the properties necessary for correctness of the algorithm; it needs forward iterators, which are input iterators with some additional properties. This error was noticed and corrected in later versions of 26] . Attempting to use MELAS to verify the original version fails, but with the revised speci cation we are able to complete the proof.
A third, more complex, example 28] that has been veri ed with MELAS is the STL merge algorithm, which contains a while loop and an if-then-else statement; it also makes two calls of the copy algorithm, one nested in the argument list of the other. The practice of using one generic algorithm in programming another is typical of STL and leads to reduced overall e ort in verifying the algorithms. For example, in the proof of merge, each call of copy can be dealt with using only the post-updating function copy spec. This makes the proof simpler than if the copying were written in line with a while loop, which would require speci cations and inductive proofs for the loop.
